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T
he conventional wisdom concerning the
interaction between economic development
and financial system structure is that there
are three stages (see, e.g., Gurley and Shaw, 1960,
Goldsmith, 1969, and Allen and Gale, 2000). In
this process of historical development, increasing
per capita income and financial depth reinforce
each other, and the transaction costs of establishing
financial institutions and markets play a key role.
In the first stage, where the level of development is
low, investment is self-financed. The only financial
instrument is money. At moderate levels of develop-
ment, the second stage, banks and other financial
institutions start to play a role. These financial insti-
tutions transfer resources from agents with excess
funds to agents that need funds to invest and con-
sume. They also provide liquidity insurance and a
range of other services. At the third stage, formalized
markets develop for agents (including financial
institutions) to trade in. These markets improve
the efficiency of the allocation from surplus units
to deficit units and allow risk sharing. 
This interesting paper contributes to the litera-
ture on financial system structure and growth by
showing that it is not just transactions costs that
matter for the development of banking systems.
Monetary policy is also an important determinant
of the extent of intermediation. The paper develops
a model based on the interaction of the transactions
costs of intermediation and monetary policy. The
main result is that some low-income countries that
have high inflation and a poorly developed banking
system may be able to improve the banking sector
by lowering the rate of inflation. They give the exam-
ples of Argentina in the 1980s and early 1990s,
Brazil in the 1990s, and Bolivia in the 1980s. In all
these countries a reduction in inflation was accom-
panied by a significant growth in the financial sector.
The model assumes an overlapping generations
framework with two-period-lived individuals. These
people are endowed with 1 unit of labor when they
are young, which provides their income. They save
their labor income for their old age, which is when
they consume. The individuals have constant rela-
tive risk aversion utility functions with a degree of
risk aversion between 0 and 1. 
An important role is played by liquidity shocks.
These are modeled by assuming there are two islands
with limited communication between them but
perfect communication within each one. After they
have made their saving decisions, individuals find
out whether they have to relocate to the other island.
Initially, the proportion that relocates is known but
the identities of who has to relocate are not. 
Production takes place on each island using
capital and labor. The production function is Cobb-
Douglas and displays constant returns to scale. The
assets available for saving are physical capital and
money. Physical capital cannot be moved between
the islands but money can be. 
If there are no banks, you have to abandon your
capital if you are relocated and the capital is lost to
you and to society as a whole. In contrast, if there
is a bank, a person who is forced to relocate can
withdraw money from the bank before moving and
take it with her. There is no private or social loss of
capital. Banks thus provide liquidity insurance.
Money is printed by the government in order
to purchase the final good. Government expenditure
does not have any direct effect on people’s behavior. 
In the first case analyzed, there are no banks
and people save using direct holdings of physical
capital and money. Physical capital has a higher
return but cannot be relocated and is wasted if
relocation occurs. Currency has the advantage that
it can be transported. It has an opportunity cost that
depends on the rate of inflation and the marginal
product of capital. The optimal portfolio of physical
capital and money depends on the trade-off between
the opportunity cost of holding currency and the
probability of relocation. The main result is that
there is a unique steady state for the economy. This
is a fairly simple case, so the result is not particularly
surprising.
In the second case, individuals put their savings
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capital and money. If a person is relocated she can
withdraw the currency and take it with her. The
banks thus provide liquidity insurance. On the other
hand, banks are costly because of fixed transaction
costs. In this case, two steady states exist, one with
a high nominal interest rate and one with a low
nominal interest rate. 
The main result of the paper is to show that
whether agents choose autarky or intermediated
saving depends on monetary policy. General equi-
librium effects are complex because the bank has
to make a decision about how much liquidity to
hold. There are two possible situations. In the first,
for low nominal interest rates, currency has a low
opportunity cost, so autarky prevails and banks are
not used; for high nominal interest rates, currency
has a high opportunity cost and banks are used. 
In the second situation, for low and high nomi-
nal interest rates autarky prevails and banks are not
used; for intermediate rates banks are used. The
intuition for the second situation is the same as the
first. The difference between the two situations is
that, in the second, at high nominal rates less liquid-
ity insurance would be offered by banks. As a result,
it becomes unattractive to pay the fixed cost to use
the bank, so people save on their own. This second
case shows that a lack of banks may be due to mone-
tary policy that causes high inflation and high nomi-
nal rates. A change in monetary policy may lead to
the establishment of banks.
This is an interesting paper on an important
topic that is well worth reading. It is quite thought
provoking and opens up many interesting questions
for future research.
1. Is there any historical or other evidence that
can determine the validity of the conven-
tional wisdom that transaction costs alone,
rather than monetary policy, lead to the
absence of banks? For example, in the 19th
century, did adopting the gold standard help
the financial systems of some countries?
2. How important to the results is the loss of
self-financed capital in the autarkic system
when relocation occurs? If the interpretation
is that people are self-financed entrepreneurs,
then this is a reasonable assumption. Another
possible interpretation is that there are part-
nerships or firms with multiple owners. In
this case, the output from the capital would
not be lost but would be transferred to the
other owners. It would be interesting to see
whether this made any difference to the
results.
3. What precisely is the role of liquidity insur-
ance provided by banks versus the loss of
output from relocation under autarky? An
interesting special case might involve log
utility. In the Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
framework, liquidity insurance does not pro-
vide any benefit in this case. Is this true here?
A good benchmark model might be log utility,
no social loss of output under relocation, and
no fixed costs of setting up a bank. Autarky
and banking might be equivalent here. It
could then be seen which assumptions are
most important for the results obtained.
4. What is happening to government expenditure
in the comparison of autarky and banks? If
government expenditure is higher in the high
nominal rate autarkic equilibrium, then it may
be that the inflation tax is an efficient tax.
5. Is a welfare analysis of any kind possible? Can
the steady states be compared? Are welfare
comparisons possible in the numerical
examples?
6. What would happen with equity markets?
Would this eliminate liquidity insurance and
be worse than the banking system in the
same way as in Jacklin (1987)? When would
equity markets occur in equilibrium? This
might provide an interesting contrast to the
conventional wisdom discussed initially.
7. If aggregate uncertainty could be introduced,
the interaction of monetary policy, financial
structure, and financial stability could be
investigated. This is a crucial issue that has
had relatively little research devoted to it. It
deserves much more attention.
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